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join the Andrews Group from shutting off the Irrigation
Company's wells. As to it, the court granted the injunction and the Andrews Group have appealed. The
Irrigation Company is the sole respondent. The only
question to be determined on that appeal is whether the
court correctly enjoined the Andrews Group from resorting to self-help in closing the Irrigation Company
wells.
The second case was an action brought in the lower
court to review the decision of the State Engineer in approving a change application filed by the Irrigation Company. The trial court affirmed the State Engineer and
the Andrews Group have appealed. Again, the Irrigation
Company is the sole respondent. The only issu.e on that
appeal is whether the trial court erred in affirming the
State Engineer.
The third case was brought by the Fowkes Group
against the Andrews Group and the Irrigation Company.
It involved the question of whether a. prior appropriator
has a vested right to artesian pressure. The trial court
held that they did, and ordered both Andrews and the
Irrigation Company to take steps to pump water for the
Fowkes Group. Both the . A.ndrews Group and the Irrigation Compnny have appealed from this derision, and
the Fo,vkPs Group are the respondents. The Irrigation
Compa.ny hns heretofore filed its Appellant's Brief in
this third rase.
This hrif'f, therefore, is a respondent ,s brief, even
though \rl\ hnYe her<?tofort~ filed an nppellnnt's brief in
( . nse 3770.
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ARGUMENT
I. IRRIGATION COMPANY v. ANDREWS,
CIVIL NO. 3763.
In this case there is but a single issue : Did the trial
court err in enjoining the Andrews Group from closing
our wells 1 This issue has two facets. First, under general law, can one water user resort to self-help and take
it upon himself to shut off the wells of another~ And second, was the general law here changed by private contract 1 On the first point the trial court found by its Finding No. 7, Tr. 169, that all matters dealing with the administration and distribution of water are by statute
vested in the State Engineer, and ''no one has the right
or authority to undertake to open or close any well without express permission of the State Engineer.'' The
Andrews Group in their appeal do not challenge the correctness of this holding. They do contend, however, that
a contract between the Irrigation Company and their predecessor Roundy gave them the right to close the wells,
and that the court erred in not making detailed findings
concerning the contract.
A. The court did not commit re1Jersible error in
failing to make deta.iled fvndings on thP
contract.

The Andrews Group complain because the court did
not make findings concerning a contract, under the terms
of which the Irrigation Company was permitted to drill
the wells on Andrews' ground. No request for findings
was filed in the court below, nor does the brief point
3
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out the manner in which the Andrews Group claims they
were prejudiced by the failure to make findings. As a matter of substance, they were not entitled, under the contract, to close the well. Had the court made findings, it
would have been compelled, under the evidence, to so
find. The law does, of course, require the court to make
findings on all rnaterial issues raised by the pleadings,
and the failure to do so is error. But it is well established
finding would not have affected the judgment. See, for
that it is not reversible error where the only possible
example, Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah 292, 43 P. 2d 700, where
the holding as reflected by the headnote is as follows:
''Trial court's failure to make finding- regarding undenied allegation in answer held harmless,
where only one finding was possible and finding,
if made, "Tould not have affected judgment, and
hence new trial would be futile.''
The Andrews Group note the line of Utah cases
placing the duty on the trial court to find on all material
issues, but they do not even attempt to point to evidence which 'vould justify a finding which would permit
them to shut off our wells. They don't point to any,
becan~e ther(_~ isn •t any such eYidenee. Had the court made
findings, it 'vould haYe been compelled to find that the contract provision involved permitted the capping of t'Yo of
its five "·ells upon the happening of t"¥o conditions. First,
the determination that our "¥ells interfered "ith the Andrews flo"· 'veils, and secondly, that after the amount of
damage rnused hy such interft~rence "¥as assessed, the
Irrigation ('1ompnny refused to pay the damage. The evidPnee stnnds nncontrndicted to the effect that no damages
4
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were assessed, the Irrigation Company didn't refuse to
pay damages which were assessed, and it is not in default. Under the express terms of the contract, Andrews
was not entitled to shut off the wells. The background
facts should be stated.
The Irrigation Company wells are drilled on lands
which are now owned by Andrews. Permission to drill
the same was covered by three contracts (Defendant's
Ex. 1 and plaintiffs' Ex. C and D). The first is dated
April 7, 1951. It grants to the Irrigation Company the
right to drill one or more wells in Sections 17 and 18.
The second agreement is dated June 25, 1951, and it
grants the right to drill one or more wells in Section 8.
In consideration for the grant by Andrews' predecessor
(Roundy) of the right to drill, the Irrigation Company
gave Roundy the right to use water from two of the wells
to be drilled. Neither of these said anything about capping the wells. Three of the five wells were drilled under
these agreements.

',.

The third agreement is dated November 2, 1953. It
recites that Andrews' predecessor (Roundy) owned certain flow wells, that it wasn't known whether wells to be
drilled in Section 8 under the 1953 agreement would interfere with those flows, but it provided that if the flow in
any one of Andrews flow wells was diminished, each party
to the agreement would choose a competent engineer and
they, "\Vith the State Engineer, were to determine whether
the driving of any well under the November, 1953, agreement had affected or diminished the flow of the Andre~Ts
;)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

flow wells. In the event these engineers determined that
the wells drilled under the 1953 agreemnt did interfere,
then they were to assess the amount of damage which was
caused to the flow wells by the interference. The Irrigation Company agreed to pay such damages, or in the alternative to "immediately cap and discontinue the use of
any such well so drilled hereunder.''
Two wells were drilled under this agreement. The
Andrews Group were capping all the wells (R. Vol. 1;
R. 5, 7, 28), and at the time they were capping them they
had not even requested appointment of engineers. Clearly,
the Irrigation Company was not in default in failing to
pay damages, and the closing of any of the wells was entirely without right. The Irrigation Company thus
brought suit in July of 1956 for an injunction.
Thereafter the plaintiffs Fowkes, on September 7,
1956, filed Civil Action 3770. The Andrews Group, on
October 1, 1956, filed a cross-claim in which they asked the
court to determine that the fi,e Irrigation Company wells
interfered 'vith both the . .lndrews flow and pump wells;
to adjudge that by rea.son of the interference Andrews
waR damaged in the amount of $15.000, and to grant an
• injunction to close the Irrigation ("iompany wells. This
cross-clnim embraeed all the issues "Thich under the contract \\'l"lre to haYe been decided by three engineers. It
nlso prest")ntPrl other issues such as interference with the
pump \\·Pll, ete. r_rlll") Irrigation Company. "·ithout objection, joint")d isslH). _.:\nd rr'\\·s had also filed CiYil Action
3768, appealing the StatE? Engineer's decision. On October
n, 1!lf>6, 1ht) thrPP eases \Yl)re consolidated for trial. and on

6
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the same date trial was set for December 6, 1956 (R. Vol.
2, R. 106).
It was after all this that the Andrews Group, for the
first time, on November 21st, made a demand by letter for
the Irrigation Company to appoint an engineer
(Ex. A21). The Irrigation Company answered to the
effect that these issues were already before the court for
decision (Ex. A 22). No effort was made by the Andrews
Group to withdraw these issues from the court, but to the
contrary they adduced evidence of their damage and
urged the trial court to determine these issues. The trial
court did so, and denied this claim for damages.
Thus, under the express wording of the contract, they
were not entitled to close any of our wells. The contract
expressly provides that the wells drilled under the contract can be capped only if damages are assessed and the
Irrigation Company fails to pay. In this rase no damages
'vere allowed, and the Irrigation Company is not in default for having failed to pay damages. Appellants can
hardly complain because the court decided these issues
instead of the engineers to be appointed under the contract, for the issues were presented to the court by them.
The Andrews Group thus had no right to cap the
wells., Under general law no one can resort to self-help
in the administration of water rights. Under the contract
the wells could only be capped if damages 'vere assessed
and we refused to pay. Neither of these has happened.
Two other assignments of error are made on the
appeal in this injunction case. They assert that the Irri7
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gation Company had the burden of proof on non-interference and that the evidence shows that it was the Irrigation Company's wells which interfered. These two
points are re-stated by Andrews as a part of the argument on the cross appeal in the Fowkes case. They go
to the issue of damages, and we think are more appropriately discussed as a part of the Fowkes case. We,
therefore, defer our answer as to those two assignments.
II. ANDREWS v. IRRIGATION COMPANY
'
CIVIL NO. 3768.
This case was brought by the Andrews Group. It is
an appeal under Sections 73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, from the
order of the State Engineer approving the Irrigation
Company change application. It presented to the court
a single issue: Did the State Engineer err in approving
the change? The Fowkes Group also raised this point in
the District Court, but they have not appealed from its
ruling. Thus, the Andrews Group on this issue are the
sole appellants and the Irrigation Company is the sole
respondent .
.A. The cou rf d1~d ·not err in failing to 1nake
additional findings.

The ass~rtion that the trial court should have made
additional findings regarding the change application is
also raised for th~ first time on appeal No objection was
made in th~ court belo":r concerning the adequacy of the
finding-~. rrht' findings entered in regard to the change
npplient.ion n rP in the form of conclusions of fact, but nobody objf'etf'<L Finding No. 13 stated that there was

8
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unappropriated water, and that "the Irrigation Company's Applications 22760 and A-2786 (the change) were
proper, and that the statutory requirements of approval
were complied with by applicants in each instance" (Tr.
169). As a conclusion of law the court held that the State
Engineer's decision on the change should be affirmed. In
the absence of any objection to this form of finding in the
court below, the objection that the findings are not sufficiently detailed is not well taken when raised on appeal.

B. The la~v and evidence both sustain the trial
court's action in approving the change.
The holder of an approved water application is by
express statute granted the right to change the point of
diversion. See Section 73-3-3, U. C. A. 1953. The only
limitation is that the change must not impair the vested
right of others. In determining whether a vested right
has been impaired, the burden of proof is on the person
opposing the change. This is noted in k9alt Lake City v.
Boundary Springs, 2 Utah 2d 141, 210 P. 2d 453, where
the court said :
''A change application cannot be rejected without a showing that vested rights will therehy he
substantially impaired. While the applicant has
the general burden of showing that no impairment
of vested rights will result from the change, thP
person opposing such application must fail if th(l
evidence does not disclose that his rights 'vlll be
impaired.''
Before reviewing the evidence on interference, it
might be well to state the exact nature of the change
which was made. The Irrigation Company filerl its
9
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Application No. 22760 to appropriate 18 c. f. s. of water
from three wells in Sections 17 and 18. This application
was approved April 9, 1951. The application is attached
as an exhibit to the Andrews complaint, Civil No. 3768.
Complete logs of the wells were introduced as plaintiff's
Ex. 3. These logs show that the first well was completed
June 16, 1951. At that time it was tested at 1.5 c.f.s. flow
and test pumped at the rate of 1350 g. p. m. The second
well was completed August 6, 1951. It was tested on
August 6th at 900 g. p. m. The Irrigation Company
filed its change application No. A-2786 in 1953. The
change proposed to take the same quantity of water
(18 c. f. s.) from the basin, but to take the water from
five wells instead of from the original three. The locations of the three wells were shifted about one-half mile
north into Section 8. See the map, Plaintiff's Ex. B. The
last three wells were completed by December, 1954. It
should be emphasized here that the change did not seek
permission to withdraw more water from the basin. It
merely changed the point at which the water was to be
"'"ithdra\\'"11. This is important, because the testimony,
\vithout contradiction, shows that it is the quantity withdra "'"n from the basin, and not the point at which it is
\\~i thdra \\'"11 "'"hich has ra used the lowering of water tables
and the interference \vith the sha1lo"" wells.
From reading appellants' brief it appears that the
eomplaint lH.>ing- made is not that \Ye are taking water
from the llP\\. point of diversion, but rather they complain b('en nHP "'"e are taking \\'"ater from the hydrologic
basin at alL rp]H"r<."\ is no eYidence referred to by appellants, nor is tlHlre allything in the record ey·en tending

10
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to show that the taking of a given quantity of water in
Section 8 will cause more or less interference than the
taking of the same quantity of water in Sections 17 or
18. As a matter of fact, the evidence is exactly to the
contrary. The Irrigation Company is taking a total of
2.74 c. f. s. from the basin at all five points. Two of the
five wells were drilled at the original points, leaving
about 2 c. f. s. from the three wells in Section 8. If the
taking of 2 c. f. s. of water from Section 8 would interfere,
but the taking of 2 c. f. s. from Sections 17 or 18 would
not, then it would be the change, which would be causing
the interference. For example, a well may be drilled so
close to an existing well that it would directly and immediately cause it to go dry. This may happen even
though the quantity of water withdrawn from the basin
by the new well has no measurable effect on water levels
in the basin as a whole. The interference would be solely
due to the close location. In this example, if the same
well had been kept at a more distant point, there would
have been no interference, even though the same quantity of water were taken. In such an assumed case, it
would be the close locatiDn with reference to the other
well and not the amount of water taken which would
cause the interference. None of this is involved here.
None of the wells drilled by the Irrigation Company is
located so close to the wells of the appellants as to cause
that type of interference. The interference here results
solely from the withdrawal of water from the basin. The
lowering of water tables would have been the same if thP
wells had been left at the original locations. It is thP
taking of 1AJ'ater from the basin and not the I or·ation of
11
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the wells which gives grounds for complaint. Dr. Hansen again and again affirmed that this is true (R. 147).
He said that the area in which the Irrigation Company
wells were drilled is the lower part of the basin, and
that:

'.'I would have difficulty thinking that a slight

location - change in the ·v. ~ell would have any influence in the behavior of the basin itself. * * *
I \\Tould see no particular reason to think that one
location \Yould have much more influence on the
basin than any other. The size of the well would
he far more important." (R. 148)
On cross-examination, beginning at page 171, the
matter was explained in detail. He was asked whether
taking the \Yater from the coarser materials where the
last three "\veils ''ere drilled wouldn't ha--ve a tendency to
cause greater interference with the flow wells. He answered that he wouldn't see it that way. "It wouldn't
make much difference whether you took the water out of
one "\Veil or the other. If you lowered it (the water table)
ten feet, it would haYe the same influence on the flowing
well." He "Tent on to say, "The basin is so small that
I can ,t belicYe that it 'vould make much difference where
)TOn took the "Tater. It ''ould still haYe the same interf\'rPIH'<.l, pro\'·iding you "Tithdre\Y the same quantity of
"·a1Pr. '' H0 also noted that because of the location, the
\\'Qll '"hieh "Tould interfert) "Tith the shallow 'veils the
mo~t - - nlorl) than all the other " . .ells put together "·onld hP ;\ HdrP\Ys' O\\Tll pump \Yt:."}ll (R. 173). He \Yas
corrohorat('d a8 to this hy all of the tests. By closing
:lnd opt'ning the .A ndrl~\\T~ pump ''Tell itnmediate and sub1:2
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stantial interference could be measured in the flow wells
(R. Vol. 2, p. 20-24; R. 14-15). The same end result
could be obtained by closing and opening the Irrigation
Company wells, but the effect was less immediate
(R. Vol. 2, p. 37). No witness testified to the contrary.
The conclusion is inescapable that it is not the cha;nge in
location, but the withdrawal of water which has affected
the flow wells. The change was correctly approved.
III. FOWKES v. CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY .A.ND ANDREWS, CIVIL
NO. 3770:
In regard to Point III, the Andrews Group and the
Irrigation Company are appellants, and the Fowkes
Group are the respondents. If the court holds with the
Irrigation Company on its contention (raised on its
appeal) that there is no vested right to artesian pressures, such holding would dispose of this Point III in its
entirety. The Andrews Group in their brief have ignored the brief filed by the Irrigation Company, so we
have no way of knowing from their brief what position
they take on the matters there raised. They do argue some
additional matters as to which we need to comment.
They first note the argument that the court ignored
Andrews' legal rights established by contract. They
argued this in detail on their appeal in the injunction
suit, and we have answered it there. We will not repeat
the argument here.
Their next point also was argued by them in the illjunction suit. It is that the burden was on the Irrigation
Company to show that its wells did not interfere with the
13
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springs and wells of the prior users. While this was
argued by them in connection with the injunction suit
we did not answer it there, for it relates to their clai~
for damages.

A. In their suit for money damages, the burden
of proof was on the Andrews Group
We think that in making the assertion that the Irrigation Company had the burden of proof, the Andrews
Group are not making a necessary distinction. The trial
court's holding was contained in Finding No. 15. That
finding " . as in part as follows :
''That Andrews has failed to sustain the burden of proof, to show the net effect of the interference caused to his flowing ''ell, and spring by
the Irrigation Company, as opposed to and distinguished from the effect caused by his own
pump "~ell • • *. ''
The Andrews Group had claimed damage for loss of
crops because their flow wells and spring had ceased to
flo"r. The evidence conclusively showed that their own
pump \\rell \Yas a contributing cause of the lower water
table. ..:\s the a hove quoted finding demonstrates, the case
did not turn on the issue of interference, nor on the burden of proof as to interference. Damages were denied to
1\ndre\vs, solely beeause the court could not determine
from the PYidence \Yhat portion of their claimed damage
\\'as proximatt'ly caused by their o"rn pump and what part
\vas eausPd by the Irrigation Company. Perhaps ·we
should let the matter rt")st at this point, but even if the
problem \VPre one of burden of proof as to interferenc-e,
appPllants eannot preYnil.

14
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The argument that the Irrigation Company has the
burden of proof ''because it is the plaintiff,'' simply isn't
correct. On the issue of damages, the Andrews Group
were the plaintiffs. This issue was brought into the case
by their cross-claim filed in the Fowkes suit. They sought
affirmative relief in the form of money damages against
the Irrigation Company. The fact that they did this by a
pleading called a "cross-claim" rather than by a "complaint'' makes no difference. The Andrews Group as
plaintiffs were endeavoring to recover money damages.
The Irrigation Company was the defendant. Clearly, the
burden of proof in a damage suit is on the plaintiff. The
trial court by its finding No. 15 so held and denied
damages.
The next reason given to support the argument that
've had the burden of proof is based on a number of cases
which hold that where an appropriator comes into a water
basin and claims to have developed new 'vater, the burden of proof is on him to show that he has in fact developed new water. This principle is so well established
in the law as to be beyond question. But that principle
simply isn't involved here. We have made no contention
that we have found a new source of water. Admittedly,
we drilled in the same hydrologic basin which supplies
the springs, the shallow wells and the pump well. We are
not contending that we have found a new and independent
water supply. We admittedly have not developc~d new
water. The cases cited by the appellants involve an entirely different problem. In these cases an appropriator
has gone into a basin, and drilled a well or dug a drain
15
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or tunnel. He contends that the waters which he has
intercepted would not have found their way to the stream
and would not have been available to the prior appropriator. He claims he has developed new water. In a suit
to quiet title, or in an appeal from a ruling on an application to appropriate water, the courts have held that the
new appropriator ha~ the burden of proving that he has
found a new source of supply. If the evidence is in doubt,
he must lose, for there is a presumption that water developed within a basin is a part of the basin.
But we don't see how these cases help the Andrews
Group. They have set up a "straw man" and destroyed
it. Nobody is here contending that a new and independent source of water has been intercepted. All of the
parties to this appeal have wells which are supplied by
the same water source. There is a single hydrologic basin.
By drawing water from this basin, the water level in the
underground reservoir can be lowered. We admit that
our 'veils contribute to the lowering of the " . ater table,
and in that manner interfere. But as is noted by the court
in its Finding No. 15, the .A._ndrews pump well has the
same effect, and damages " ..ere denied, because the
court could not tell ho"· much of the claimed damage
was caused by the Irrigation Company and how much by
their o\\·n pump. As plaintiffs e.laiming damage the burden of pro,·ing that the Irrigation (--.ompany caused their
dama.ge "·n~ on them.

We presume that the .A.ndre,Ys Group themselves
c. an 't HPpR rn tP the damage, bee a use their only argument
on nppPnl is thnt on n dnmng-(_~ suit '"'e had the burden of
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proof, and this, of course, is not the law. The court committed no error in this regard.

B. There was no error in Finding No. 15.
The next assignment of error is that the court erred
in making its Finding No. 15 to the effect that the Irrigation Company well had not measurably interfered with
the Andrew' ''springs and wells.'' Reference to the finding at Tr. 169 will show that the court didn't mention
springs in this part of the finding. Its finding in this regard was:

.~

!.'

"and that Andrews has failed to sho\v any
measurable interference between the Irrigation
Company wells and his pump \vell.''
This is a correct finding. Andrews testified himself
that even with the Irrigation Company wells flowing, he
was still able to get water and he was not able to say that
he was not getting his full 6 c. f. s. from his pump well
(R. Vol. 1, p. 6). There is thus no measurable interference. Mr. Mayo said that with his pump Andrews can get
his full 6 c.f.s. right (Vol. 2, p. 39). His only possible complaint could be that he is having to pump the water an
additional distance - but how much~ What would the
drawdown be from his own pumping~ I-Iow much greater
is his lift because our wells exist~ If this court ltolds that
he had a vested right to artesian pressure, nn<1 in addition
holds that the last person to drill has the burden of proving how much drawdown would come from the pump, how
much from nature, and how much from the new well~'-\, all
ground \Vater development has come to an end. Here
Andre"rs is able to get every drop of "rater to whirh lH~ is
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entitled with his existing pump. Still he claimed damages. In his claim for damage he was unable to show how
much of the drawdown was caused by his own pumping
operation. The court so found, and this was not error.

C. The Irrigation Company ~vells were not the
sole cause of the lowered water table.
The Andrews Group urge that the court could have
found that the Irrigation Company wells were the sole
cause of the shallow wells going dry. Such is not the evidence. The evidence shows that Andrews have been withdrawing 6 c. f. s. from the underground basin by means
of a pump. The period of use under their application
covers from April 1st to October 15th, a period of 198
days (Ex. A-30). Six c. f. s. will yield 12 acre feet per day,
and over the irrigation season allowed in their approved
application, this would permit withdrawal of 2376 acre
feet of water per season. The evidence shows that in 1954
the well was pumped from May through November ('7ol.
2, page 103) and thus approximately 2300 acre feet were
\vithdra"\\rn by Andre,vs that season.
The shallow flow "\\7 ells were capped in the Fall of
1954. When they 'vere opened a.bout .4.-\.pril1st, 1955, they
wouldn't flo"·· Gerald Fowkes so testified (R,. 89). The
Andrews Group contend that since their pumps were shut
off in N o\·ember of 1~1;)4, and the sha.llo"r 'vells were dry
when the~· \Yere opeiH.}d the follo,ving April, the Irrigation
Compnny "·e1ls drilled in 1954 must be held to the sole
cause. '~J..1hi ~ just eonld not be so.
Our last three \\"Plls w·ere completed by December of
18
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1954, and as the court found in its Finding No. 5, the five
wells combined yield, without pumping, 2.74 c. f. s.,
or 5.48 acre feet per day. After the Andrews pump well
was closed in November, 1954, the Irrigation Company
took 5.48 acre feet of water per day for a period .of less
than 120 days. This would have withdrawn about 660 acre
feet of water. The Andrews' argument, if correct, would
require the court to hold (1) that this 660 acre feet was
the sole cause of the flow wells going dry; (2) that the
Andrews Group's withdrawal during the previous summer, of 2300 acre feet, had nothing whatever to do with it;
(3) that Andrews could have started their pump well in
the Spring of 1955, and taken 2300 acre feet that summer,
and 2300 in the summer of 1956, and that their withdrawal would not have diminished the flow in the flow
·wells. Clearly if our 660 acre feet would have dried up
the flow wells, the withdrawal of 2300 acre feet the next
season by Andrews would have had the same effect and
the Andrews pump well was pumped both in 1955
and 1956.

Counsel also point to the testimony of Roundy to thP
effect that the pumping of the Andrews well increasrd the
flow of the Andrews flow wells. This is noted to convin('e
the court that the pump well did not hurt the flow wellR.
Yet the tests conducted by the State Engineer es1al>liRhed
beyond any doubt that by opening and closing the Andrews pump well, the water table in the And rP"'S flo"·
wells could be raised and lowered. These tests were conducted by Mr. Mayo. He noted a direct and immediate
connection between the two (Vol. 2, p. 20-24, R. 14-15).
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The connection is more direct and more immediate than
the connection with the Irrigation Company wells
(Vol. 2, p. 30).
Andrews was the plaintiff seeking money damage,
and the court held on this evidence that it could not determine the extent to which our usage and the extent to
which Andrews' usage contributed to drying up the flow
wells, and how much of Andrews' own damage was caused
by their own operations.
IV. WE AGREE THAT THE COURT DISREGARDED PRIORITIES.
The Andrews Group complained because the court
did not acknowledge the priority on their flow wells and
pump wells, but they too over-simplify the problem. They
say that the court approached the problem as though
there were only two priorities. First came Fowkes and
then all the rest. The Andrews Group want to treat the
matter as though there were only three priorities. First,
the Fowkes, second the Andrews, and third the Irrigation Company. Neither approac.h is correct.
The earliest priorities are the spring rights. The
court has expressly held t.ha t the springs belong to Andrews aud Fowkes during the irrigation season and to the
Irrigation Company during the rest of the year. Thus,
the Irrigation Company is itself interested in the spring
\Vater, e111d if any kind of a priority system is going to
he put into effect, thflY arP n~ much entitled to the spring
flo\v 8:-\ nre the others. The irrigation season seldom lasts
more thnn 1flO day~. During the oth~r t"ro hundred odd
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days the springs would belong to the Irrigation Company.
Thus, all three of the parties hereto from the point of
priority have equal rights in the priorities which govern
the springs.
The second priorities in point of time are the shallow
wells. These are owned by Andrews and Fowkes. The
court made no effort to fix which "\vere first.
The third priority is the railroad well which is leased
and under the control of the Irrigation Company now but
it is owned by the railroad. It has dried up, and any replacement order, if administered strictly on a priority
basis, would have to provide for the railroad well.
The fourth order of priority would be the Andrews
pump well. The fifth order of priority would be the Irrigation Company wells, which at the moment are produced only by flow, but which will have to be pumped to
give to the Irrigation Company its appropriated right.
Then come other filings which are in the same basin
and which are either drilled or to be drilled in the future.
There were at least three existing filings which had been
made after the Irrigation Company's filings.
These were pending before the State Engineer at
the time of the trial. The evidence, as is argued in detail
in our appellant's brief, is to the effect that there is still
unappropriated water in the basin. A.s the threp filings
which were made by persons not parties to this suit n re
developed and still new filings are placed in the basin, an
order "\vhich requires replacements now will not be appropriate if the other 'veils are drilled.
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If the court holds against us on the main point involved in this appeal, to-wit, that there is a vested right
in artesian pressure, we believe that some provision must
be made to administer the water rights. The court should
not simply order each of the parties to replace half of the
water for the plaintiffs Fowkes under all conditions. This
would be res judicata as between these parties, no matter
what happens. During any given water year, it may be
that the Andrews' well could be pumped without drying
up the flow wells, and that during such a year (if there
were any way to identify it) perhaps the Irrigation Company should replace all the water. There may be other
times during dry years when the Irrigation Company
wells should be shut off for a number of years, and Andrews would be compelled to replace all the water, including our winter flow from the springs and our flow from
the railroad well. If we start pumping our wells, which
we have the right to do, our withdrawal may far exceed
that by Andrews. If Andrews drills his second well,
'vhich he has the right to do, his withdrawals may far
exceed ours. As other parties drill, they, if the same
rule applies, would ha.Ye to pump for all of us. A hard and
fa.st rule should not be entered to become frozen or fixed
for all time to eome, eYen if circumstances change.
CPrtainl~,.

there "·ill be no administration of water on
a priority basis "·here, "·ithout regard to the quantity
available in the basin, or the quantity used Andrews and
the Irrigation Compnny aTe each ordered to replace onehalf of the "·a ter for the Fo,vkes. It ignores the Irrigation
Compn ny '~ ""inter rights. It ignores the Irrigation Company·H rnilrond 'Yell rig-hts. It ignores the .A.ndre"rs flow
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well rights, all of which are prior to the Andrews pump
well and the Irrigation Company flow well. We too believe that the court's solution to the problem presented
is arbitrary, incomplete and ineffectual. A more flexible
rule which can be administered should, in any event, be
ordered.

V. WATER IS NOT BEING "~liNED."
An effort is apparePtly made on page 33 of the Andrews brief to demonstrate that water is being ''mined''
from this basin. This isn't supported by the evidence.
The maximum drawdown during the period of maximum use didn't take the water more than nine feet from
the surface (Vol. 2, p. 38). Both Dr. Hansen and Mr.
Mayo were of the· opinion that the basin had not been
fully appropriated (VoL 2, p. 58-59, 198-9, 147). After
full use by Andrews and the Irrigation Company in 1955,
the water table had come up, and the flow wells had
started to flow by April of 1956 (R.66). A_fter full use
in the summer of 1956, the water table was coming back
at the time of the trial and was in fact rising ''rather
sharply," (R. 24). In fact, on December 6, 1956, the date
of the trial, one well had started to flow ( R. 32). Certainly this clearly shows that the basin is not over-a ppropriated. Also, 1954 to 1956, were relatively dry water
years (R. 37). The fact of the matter is that we have an
underground reservoir which is lowered only a few fePt
during periods of use, but it has come back nearly to
ground surface in the winter and both at the end of the
1955 season (R. 90) and the 1956 season, at least one of
the wells had started to flow (R. 32). The trial court found
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as a faet that there is unappropriated water in the basin.
Certainly this finding is supported by the above noted
evidence.

VI. IT WAS NOT ERROR TO STRIKE ~IR.
GARDNER'S TESTIMONY ON EVAPORATION AND TRANSPORTATION
LOSSES.
There was no issue presented by the pleadings which
would challenge the validity of the Irrigation Company's
appropriation from the wells. Nobody denied that the
Irrigation Company had initiated a valid right. We are
not told by counsel what issue this testimony was calculated to solve.
The parties could have spent a considerable amount
of time going into the question of irrigation efficiency.
Certainly, there would be evaporation losses from every
reservoir in the state. ~Ir. Gardner made no effort to
show (nor could he have done so) that there is anything unusual about ours, or that losses from it were
unusual. In this state it is a novel argument indeed to
argue that a water right be denied because the water is to
be placed in storage. There also are fe"~, if any, canal
systems in the state thnt don "t have some transportation
losses, both through eYaporation and canal seepage. After
the "·ater rearhes the la11d, irrigation efficiency in floodtype irrigation seldom reac.hes as high as 50 per cent.
But again there is nothing extreme in our system. We
could haYP spent t"·o or three days sho\\ring the crops we
raise, thPir eash Yalue, the number of Jiyestock, irrigated
acres, Pte., to sho"· thnt \Ve make n beneficial use of the
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water, but what purposes would have been served in this
lawsuit by so doing is nowhere shown. Thus, no issue was
presented which would make this testimony material,
and the court correctly so ruled.
VII. THE COURT CORRECTLY HEI_JD THAT
FOWKES DID NOT MITIGATE THEIR
DAMAGES.

By way of a cross-appeal, the Fowkes Group contend
that they should have been granted judgment for loss of
crops. The court found that they have suffered $1500.00
in damages, but denied judgment, because no effort was
made to mitigate damages.
It is fundamental to the law of damages that a person claiming damage must not increase his damages by
his own acts or by his failure to take active steps to minimize the loss, so long as unreasonable expense or exertion would not be involved. According to the Fowkes'
o'vn testimony, they knew about the 1st of April, or a little bit earlier (R. 85, 90) that their flow wells had ceased
to flow. Still in 1955 two of the plaintiffs Fowkes claimed
to have planted their lands to crops of barley. They knew
they weren't going to have the flow well water. The same
condition existed in 1956. Gerald Fowkes testified (R. 90)
that before the 1st of April, 1956, he opened the flow wells
and found that they would not flow. Still he again planted
his lands to barley. He claims $1152.00 for loss of 600
bushels of barley each year. John Fowkes also claims
400 bushels of barley lost in 1955 and 300 bushels of barley lost in 1956, and claims a total of $672.00. The judge's
finding in regard to damagPs doesn't indicatP how the
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court arrived at the $1500. It merely fixed the amount.
As to this claim for loss of barley the rnle is stated in
McCormick on Damages, Section 34, page 131, as follows:
''Where a purchaser of land learns that his
vendor had no title to an irrigation ditch which he
had purported to sell, and thereafter the purchaser proceeds to plant a crop, he cannot recover
for the cost of planting and loss of crop due to
the failure to secure water for irrigation."
The plaintiffs ought not to be permitted to recover
anything for the barley which they planted in 1955 and
1956, when under their own testimony they knew that
their flow wells were dry. To plant a crop of barley and
then sue for its loss comes squarely within the prohibition in the above-stated principle.
When the court ordered Andrews and the Irrigation
Company to replace the water for the Fowkes, it also expressly decreed :
'' • • • proYided, however, that such replacement • • • shall be limited to the furnishing and
installing of pumps, pumping equipment and
sources of po"·cr, capable of making such replacement of \Yater * •
it being the duty of Fo·wkes
to keep the "·ell casings in such state of repair
that the pump mny properly operate so long as
t1Hl "·ntPl' tuhlt. . remains at a point "·here "rater can
be pumped from each "rell as each \Yell now
Pxi~t~" ('rr. 174).
$.

No appeal is taken from this ruling, and it has become the la."· of the rase. The duty is thus upon the
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Fowkes to provide casings in such a state of repair as
to permit pumping of the wells. This is emphasized because .of the mitigation of damage point. The Fowkes
group state that it would have cost $7700.00 to drill
and equip. Under the court's ruling- from which there
has been no appeal -the cost of drilling a well, if that
be necessary, is the burden or cost of the Fowkes.
The Fowkes also on their mitigation of damage point
take the approach that in order to mitigate they had to
buy a pump. This was not necessary. There isn't any
reason why they could not rent pumps. This is particularly
true in regard to the claimed damages for hauling water.
Water was available in the well right by the home of Mr.
Fowkes. All he needed was a small quantity of water for
household use. Instead of renting or buying a small pump
he traveled considerable distances and expended time and
money hauling water.
The water was almost at ground surface. They had
the duty to maintain their casings so that pumps could
be attached. It was obvious that for water to be diverted,
at their wells, pumps would have to be attached. The
problem was not whether the water should be pumped,
but who should pay the cost of pumping and the cost
of installing the pumps. Instead of renting pumps and
pumping the water they needed, they went v.. ithout \ratPr
and yet planted barley on part of the land, even though
they knew in April that their wells would not flow. They
made no effort whatever to get the water. They kne"r
that they didn't have the water available to them. They
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then planted barley and sued for nearly $1800.00 damages when the barley didn't mature.
We do not disagree with the authorities cited by
Fowkes. It is the application of that law to the facts of
this case where we disagree. They approach the question
as though we had the duty of drilling for them a new well,
because the casings on their old well are worn out and
won't stand pumping (Ex. CC-1). The trial court held
to the contrary, and from this holding they have not appealed, and it is the law of the case.
They apparently didn't want to replace their wornout casings, and so they simply went without water. If
the court affirms this judgment and orders us to equip
their wells with pumps, this is still going to be a problem,
for some of their wells are deteriorated and worn out (Ex.
CC-1). The court held that they had failed to mitigate
their damages. We submit that such holding was correct.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE

Attorney for Current Creek
I rrigationf Comp·a;n.y
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